An alleged leaked document of the NCP 2015 Elections Strategy published in English for the first time this week, details the NCP’s strategy to hold on to power by any means necessary. This includes monitoring and dismantling opposition groups, along with election rigging by only recruiting and approving pro-NCP monitors; as well as clear evidence of manipulating state tools and resources to support the NCP in the upcoming elections.
Top Line Points from Internal NCP Strategy Document
Analysis of 2010 election results:
- The NCP recognizes that it has been running a totalitarian regime in order to support its orientation and enhance its legitimacy.
- Due to the reluctance in participation in 2010 elections, the NCP made a series of ‘exceptional procedures’ (e.g. registration of absentee and fictitious names) that weakened and undermined the validity of the elections.
Use of military as political tool:
- Mobilization and jihad by movements that can protect the State will help the NCP to achieve its goals. Operations of positive deterrence in Darfur and Nuba Mountains proved successful in mobilizing supporters.
- The moral focus must be on activating the Rapid Support Forces as a force to intimidate and deter the enemy.
Neutralize opposition through:
- Using the media to promote the security of Sudan over parties’ interests, enhancing national dialogue and binding it with the stability of Sudan, supporting national unity and participation of all political forces. This use of the media is designed to increase pressure on the opposition, isolate and split their lines, while at the same time win the public opinion and neutralise western diplomacy.
- Monitoring all the movements of opposition from now on in relation to the electoral process (through a special committee that coordinates with the security and intelligence apparatus).
- Monitoring and seizing all sorts of foreign funds to opposition groups.
- To take decisive decisions for disabling and dismantling all civil society organisantions (national or international) proven to be opposing the NCP. To focus on crippling their capabilities and dispersing their leadership through coordination with security and intelligence apparatus and Humanitarian Aid Commission before mid-2014 to avoid a perception in the public that these actions have been linked to the elections.
- Glorifying teachers, administrative officers, and legal representatives before the elections by handing out their dues and what is owed to them in plenty of time. Settlement of all arrears before July 2014 and guaranteeing its regularity until the end of the election process.
- A database of Sudanese in Britain was set up since 2012, given the UK is seen as the centre for overseas campaigns for the NCP. It can be used to define, neutralize and infiltrate the opposition groups that pose a threat.
- Main entry point for infiltration is social projects – through the creation of sports/football activities, ensuring constant activity for youth to keep them away from opposition political influence.
Manipulation of election results:
- When selecting committee members who will supervise the elections – they should be spotless and pro-government. Conduct background checks on existing members and distance those rejected (eg. transfer, assign them duties in other states, deputation, training missions etc.)
- Restructuring National Elections Commission to NCP advantage. Thus recruiting personnel from security, intelligence and police into the NEC early enough, by August 2014.
- Take early precautions as the NCP to design the constituencies and to re-plan them in a manner that will benefit the NCP. Here, we must pay attention to the ministry of local governance in all states and the necessity of supervising the direct governors in them in the coming period.
- To make early calls with a number of foreign organisations (pro-government) to send monitors who will favour the NCP, to weaken the effect of all opposing organisations or agencies.
This document represents extremely worrying allegations about the Government of Sudan’s attitude to the wellbeing of many of its citizens. It indicates the need for the international community to exercise extreme caution in international relations with the Government of Sudan. Sudanese civil society has long argued that governments can do much more to protect their fellow civilians and convince the Government to sincerely commit to a process for democratic reform. We hope this new information assists in furthering these objectives and ending the conflicts in Sudan.
Full Document PDF [English]
Full Document PDF [Arabic]