المجموعة السودانية للديمقراطية أولا
Sudan Democracy First Group

Initiative to Combat Violent Extremism

Violent Islamic Extremism in Sudan (1990-2018)

General Plan

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Contents   page

1. The purpose of the report

The report aims to draw a general map of the phenomenon of violent Islamic extremism in Sudan, from 1990 to 2018. The map's axes include the most important extremist religious groups in Sudan, the most important leaders of religious extremism in Sudan, the means of spreading extremist ideology and the most important reference from which the most important questions of extremist and violent religious thought are based on, the most important terrorist operations that took place in Sudan, some of the institutions involved in spreading the culture of extremism.

The report deals with the two cases of the Dindir cell as one of the most important extremist groups that have emerged in Sudan recently, and the case of the joining of a number of Sudanese students (girls and boys) from the University of Science and Technology to the Islamic State Group, as one of the most important modern issues. The report concludes by highlighting on some of the efforts undertaken by the civil and political forces, and the government efforts and their impact on the phenomenon.

2. Methodology

The report relied on office research by compiling books, reports and documents related to the topic, the author of the report also conducted lengthy interviews with three Sudanese youths, who were members and participants in groups and violent extremism events, one of them had previously gone to the state of "Mali". The other was a participant in the events of Es-Salamah, and he was previously arrested by the Sudanese security following Es-Salamah operation in 2007.

The third was a member of the Dindir cell. In addition, the report relied on a number of discussion sessions that were organized by the author of the report and/or Democracy First and other discussion groups, organized by civic and intellectual events interested in the topic. The report was based on drawing a general map and monitoring two cases of a study to extract general trends about the phenomenon of violent extremism in Sudan. This report complements the theoretical and conceptual study that was published by the Sudan Democracy First Group.

3. Introduction

The term violent extremism and the reasons of extremism

Most of the studies on the phenomenon of extremism agree that it is not related to a specific religion, culture, ethnicity or civilization, rather, it is a human phenomenon, like all phenomena that can exist at any time and in any place; Noting that there is a possibility of a central element or central elements that determine the difference in extremism from time to time, and from place to place, such as the Islamic religion in contemporary violent extremism, for example. On the other hand, it was pointed out that this phenomenon is expressed in a package of terms that meet here and separate there, according to the terms of reference of each party.

There is the term "extremism", there is the term "violent extremism", there is the term "exaggeration", there is the term "terrorism", and there is the term "Islamic extremism" and "Islamic terrorism." There is also a disagreement over the state's violence, is it terrorism or not? The evidence here is that all of these terms, and the differences between them, ultimately express a manifestation of an act or actions based on an intellectual vision that considers the other who deferent as a threat, and violence must be used to remove him. All these terms despite the differences between them they agree on the final result, which is the use of violence, meaning terrorism, and here, I prefer to use the term "extremism" to mean "violent extremism" and "terrorism", especially in relation to what the groups and organizations that used to call terrorist or extremist do. For more information regarding the term, please refer to Dr. (Amin Hassan Omar) series of articles entitled "Terrorism; Dilemmas of Identification and Confrontation", which were published in the Sudanese newspaper (Al-Sahafa) in August 2016, which is available on the web. Haji Warraq's study, entitled "Toward a Sudanese Humane View of the Issues of Violent Extremism," published in the online newspaper (Hurriyat) in March 2018. The report adopts the term "violent extremism" as the extremism that takes the Islamic religion as its reference. Extremism, with this definition, has a long history in Sudan. There are many evidences for its manifestations in the various central periods in the history of Sudan, including the post-independence period, including the accusations of Takfir (Muslim declaring another Muslim, or any individual, as a non-believer) and the provisions of apostasy, indeed, the killings events that took place during these periods with claims that based on the use of religion to justify violence in its different forms against those who disagree.

Considerable studies of violent extremism agree that this phenomenon has its own causes; each cause leads to the other. There are economic, social, psychological and political reasons, as well as the cognitive reasons related to how extremists receive their religious information, and how they interpret

a religious text. Each of these causes expands to interact and overlap with other causes, so that it is not possible to rely on one of them, whatever its reasonableness.

There are three main factors and influences that contributed to the development and formation of extremist groups:

- The emergence and development of modern Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood movement with its various names. These movements, despite the fact that most of them worked and work according to the law in many Arab and African countries, and although some of them are steadily seeking to renew many of their ideas on many critical issues, they often deal with many of the issues constituting extremism with many Pragmatism and political imperatives such as the issue of apostasy, for example, the issue of women's rights, and issues of non-Muslims' rights in the Muslim-majority country, which can be called "deferred issues" among the activist Islam groups

- The phenomenon of violent extremism is related to the dominant economic, political and cultural system, meaning the global capitalist system or neoliberalism, represented in the aspect of its violent modernity and its totalitarian centralization.

- This phenomenon is, in addition to being the result of objective and subjective conditions, but from other aspects it is "manufactured" in the sense that it was subjected or subject to "foster" that nourish, develop and improve it, and the fosters concerned here are some of the intelligence agencies, especially the CIA and its allies, such as some Arab and foreign intelligence.

4. Map of violent Islamic extremism in Sudan

The map covers many events from 1990 to 2018. These events were characterized by fundamental changes in the Sudanese and regional scene. This period also witnessed a steady growth of the currents of violent extremism, even for terrorist operations in Sudan and other countries, with Sudanese elements. Some of the variables include:

- The general rise witnessed by activist Islam in all Arab countries, especially in Sudan, where the Islamic movement was able to control power in Sudan on June 30, 1989 (which was called the government of salvation), and the consequences of this rise and control of power from the production of many ideas and practices that raised the slogans of implementing Islam, but real practices were moving in a different direction, so the salvation government seemed to many

affiliates of activist Islam to be stepping back from some of the principles of Islam, especially with regard to the application of Islamic law (Islamic Sharia), the situation of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, as well as in the relationship with the United States of America.

- The decline in confidence in the Salvation Government and its Islamic project after it was proved that it had delivered a number of violent extremism activists to their countries or the United States of America, or providing of a lot of information about extremist groups through its open cooperation with the CIA

- The formation of the Arab People's Congress and the mobilization of various anti-Western trends, including some religious extremist currents such as the Islamic Group in Egypt.

- The split of the Islamic Movement in 1999 or what is known as the separation and the emergence of the conflict over the power between the brothers of the faith.

- The period of the civil war and the declaration of jihad, and then the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the People's Movement, the effects of the culture left over from the war, and the effects of the jurisprudential views raised by the agreement related to what is known as the "traditional Sharia policy" such as the non-Muslim assumption of the great guardianship, equating a non-Muslim with a Muslim, and women's equality with men, as in the 2005 Interim Constitution.

- The civil war, especially after the formation of the People's Defense Forces, helped to enhancing the culture of dealing with weapons and the opportunities for possession of weapons for non regular forces personnel, in addition to the negative psychological effects that usually afflict those who were participating in the war or were exposed to it.

- This period witnessed the September 11, 2001 operation as the largest terrorist operation in modern history, which was carried out in the name of Islam.

- This period witnessed the growth and rise of extremist currents in Algeria, Somalia and Egypt, as well as the activity of Al-Qaeda organization with its large operations in various parts of the world.

- Also the imperial expansion and its blatant interference and dominance over many Islamic countries and his invasion of Iraq.

5. The most important extremist groups in Sudan

The modern Islamic movement, with its different currents, "the Islamic Trend and the Muslim Brotherhood", bears in its genes many of the foundations of violent extremism; However, due to its capabilities in for dealing with the challenges of reality, it has been able, to a large extent, to deal with these challenges, and to limit the growth of violent extremism and extremists within it, either through dialogue, isolation, marginalization, postponement, or pushing extremists out of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations and groups, and then joining extremist groups, or forming new groups. The same applies to the Ansar al-Sunnah Muhammadiyah group, which emerged from it many extremist currents.

Violent extremism and terrorism by its nature transboundary, and this may be due to the internationalization of Islam as it is considered a global religion, as well as because of the globalization of oppression to which Muslims are subjected, in addition to an merely important "Islamic" concept, which is the concept of (immigration), and the obligation to honor and protect the immigrant, especially if this immigrant was "one of those who were not able to live in homelands." Extremism is also closely related to another "Islamic" concept, which is the obligation of jihad whenever there are "Muslims" who need to fight alongside them. All these reasons helped the transfer of these groups from one place to another, and then the transfer of this thought from one place to another, with an observation; because of the extremist's nature and not accepting to the other opinion; so that a group of groups multiply into a number of groups.

To classify and define groups in Sudan, it is necessary to follow the global map of extremist groups and its connection with the situation in Sudan, as previously mentioned.

We mention here the most important extremist groups in Sudan:

- The "Takfir and Immigration" group: it was established in Egypt in 1977, and it has a presence in Sudan, though it is limited in the states of Khartoum and Gazira. Official authorities (Abbas Al-Baqir Abbas) who carried out Al-Jarafa terrorist operation in 2000 were attributed to this group, and Al-Jarafa mosque incident was one of the first terrorist incidents in the capital, Khartoum, which left a large number of victims. Abbas Al-Baqer accompanied three people with him, and with them four Kalashnikovs, and they attacked the prayers in the mosque of (Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq) in (Al-Jarafa) district in north of Omdurman while they were performing Taraweeh prayers, according to the Gregorian calendar the accident was in December 2000. And resulted in the death of twenty people and about fifty wounded. It is worth noting that the

Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq Mosque is one of the mosques of Ansar al-Sunna Muhammadiyah group. Abbas Al-Baqer and those with him were killed by the police forces in an exchange of fire. "It is worth noting that Abbas al-Baqer was involved in the Popular Defense Forces and participated in the battles of "recapturing the city of Kapoeta" during the civil war between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement which led by Dr. John Garang.

- The (Muslims) group: it was formed by (Abu Ahmed al-Jazaery), and many reports indicate his involvement in the assassination of the jihadist (Abdullah Azzam). As for the one who brought it to Sudan, it is (Abu Ayoub Al-Barqawi), a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, who lived for some time of his life in Emtidad Ed-Darja Althaltha (the third-degree extension) in Khartoum, and its spread and presence was limited.

- The "Immigrants to God" group: It is the group that carried out Operation "Camp 10" in 1997 near the city of Wad Madani.

- The group (Al-I'tisam bi al-Kitab wa al-Sunna): a dissident group from the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan.

- Group of (Men around the Prophet): This is the other name for the Dindir cell, which the report will discuss in detail. As the Sudan Tribune daily newspaper reported on 12/2/2012.

This is in addition to the presence of those who directly declare that they are linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

6. The most important symbols of violent extremism in Sudan

Perhaps, in pursuit of accuracy, we need to distinguish even a little between those who carry a violent extremist ideology and not a symbol of extremism, and those who carry a violent extremist ideology who is considered a symbol of extremism, because there are important jurisprudential dimensions, such as the issue of "excuse for ignorance" or not in the issue of "Takfir the appointed" and disagreement over it, or the issue of participation in the state bodies that does not govern by God's law, according to their understanding of the governance issue, the model of (Abdel-Hay Yusef), although he carries a violent extremist ideology in many issues, but he is not considered a symbol for extremists, due to his participation in the government in many of its institutions. As well as (Muhammad Othman Salih), Secretary General of the Sudan Jurists Association, and also (Mohammed Abdul Karim), because - that is, Mohammed Abd al-Karim - he does not authorize fighting the government that does not rule what by God's law. As for those who carry a violent extremist ideology and are considered symbols of the extremists; one of their characteristics is that they do not

participate in any of the state's institutions, especially institutions of a religious nature, among their characteristics also the call to fight, support for terrorist groups, and encouragement of youth to join them, such as Ansar Ed-Dine in Mali, for example, the most famous of these (Musaad Es-Sedira).

7. Mechanisms for disseminating extremist thought and its most important references

What is worth noting here is that violent extremism rests on a coherent ideological arsenal. Firstly, it has various sources and enjoys a degree of flexibility in building its intellectual system. Secondly, it raises the hypothesis that its reference is the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, and it portrays to others that its understanding is a sound and correct understanding, because it is based on the understanding of the companions and followers. It also raises the fact that it is the protector and defender of the nation's identity. At the same time, it theoretically establishes that it does not stand against the achievements of civilization, especially the material one, if it does not conflict with religion. Here it sees out himself as if he were the heir of the particular country, religion and civilization. While considering the others as infidels, agents and traitors to their religion and identity. The flexibility shows that, despite its fundamentalism, it moves freely within the religious text, as long as it was the one issuing and disseminating the fatwa; so you can find it wearing a dress for every case. For example, it stands with some dictatorships and opposes others; without any moral conscious (this flexibility comes here as a description of a situation and not a praising).

Violent extremism has a rare advantage, which is that its personal or membership are often young men and women, and their readiness to sacrifice themselves, money and time is great. Perhaps this is because they find an independent identity in these groups that is capable of granting them the legal right to get rid of the power of the father and the family. We have seen many young women even not young men who left their countries without the consent of their families, even without informing them, which is not often found in other counterpart organizations. Also, violent extremism has many resources that support its existence and movements. The first is religion itself, the second is the mosques, and the third is the domination of the non-critical and inquiring mind in our societies, which enabling it to spread. As for the most important resource, it is its use, with awareness, intentionality, and organization of the achievements of contemporary civilization, such as the Internet, especially what is known as social media. What is no disagreement about it, is that the extremist groups employ the most alternative media after businessmen, adding to this the dominance of oppression and repression in our societies, which necessarily constitute a structure that produces and creates

violence. According to these assumptions, there were many tools and means for disseminating extremist thought, and the conditions for the success of this spread were numerous.

8. Means

Groups use a number of different and overlapping means to spread extremist ideology, including: -

– Private Sessions of lesson, which are usually held in homes or private institutes, such as Musaad Al-Sedira session at his home or institute.
– Websites: The (Monotheism and Jihad Forum) is the first site in disseminating extremist ideas, the (Shumukh Al-Jihadi "Glory of Jihadist") website and the (Ansar Al-Sharia in Sudan) Facebook page.
– Lectures and seminars.
– Jihadist films.
– Books.

9. References

There are basic books that are considered a reference for extremist groups, in which relied upon in disseminating extremist thought, they are deliberated and published among extremist groups, and they are considered the basic reference for their ideas, including

- The book "Taghout" (Saeed Ibn Ali Al-Qahtani)
- "The Thirtieth Message" by (Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi)
- "Millat Ibrahim" (The religion of Ibrahim) by (Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi)
- The book "Al-Jami in Seeking Honorable Knowledge" (Ibn Abdel-Aziz Abdel-Qader), whose real name is (Syed Imam), is an Egyptian nationality, one of those who carried out intellectual reviews under the supervision of the Egyptian government, and wrote a document in this regard entitled "Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World" which criticized by (Ayman Al-Zawahiri), the leader of Al-Qaeda in his book (The Exoneration: A Message in the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and the Sword … from the deficiency of the charge of impairment and weakness).
- Speeches, lectures and talks of Sheikh (Abu Abdullah Sadiq bin Abdullah Al-Sudani)
- The book "Explanation of the Tahawiyah Creed," and the Book of "Ruling by Other Than What God Revealed" (by Ibn Abi al-Ezz).
- "Explanation The Book of Monotheism - by Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdul-Wahhab" by Dr. (Saleh bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan).
- The book "Management of savagery" (by Abu Bakr Naji).

In addition to these references, watching films that filming the jihadist operations, as well as listening to jihadist lectures and sermons.

10. Institutions involved in spreading the culture of extremism

 Some mosques: Especially the mosques of the extremist wing of the Ansar al-Sunna group, such as the Mosque of Sheikh (Muhammad Mustafa Abdul Qadir) "Block 5 Abu Sied in Omdurman", and (Mohammed Abdul Karim) mosque in the Al-Jareif suburb in Khartoum (which is attended by many young men and women in Islamic groups and seminars are organized in it, regular, and in-depth conversations around Takfir and fighting are conducted there, as well as nights of i'tikaaf (seclusion in the Mosque for worship) during the holy month of Ramadan, and mosque of Abd al-Hay Yusef in the Jabra neighborhood in Khartoum, in which many sessions and dialogues of a controversial nature are hold, in addition to what can be called political mobilization that disincentive every demand for enlightenment and liberation. From this mosque the call came out to defend female circumcision, and the call to prevent freedom of expression and to Takfir some Muslims, such as the Sudanese Shiites.

We can say that these mosques, in particular, and others in Khartoum and outside Khartoum, are the ones that create and disseminate the culture of extremism in general and violent extremism in particular and in an orderly form. Firstly, it has great freedom that is granted to it from the top of the hierarchy of power in the country, and it too, and this is what the circumstantial evidence indicates, has great financial support and great relations with its counterparts outside Sudan, namely, terrorist and extremist groups and extremist religious institutions at the regional and international level.

These mosques not only teach young people; rather, it re-prepares them and facilitates the conditions for them to join the volatile regions such as Iraq, Syria and Somalia, starting with the jurisprudential authorization of the obligatory of jihad and ending with facilitating the task of exiting and reaching the intended areas. These mosques are almost among the strongest and most dangerous areas concerned with ideology that have been able to transform their message into a reality that exists among people. It was able to change many Sudanese traditions in line with its conception of Islam. It was also able to attract a significant number of young men and women. And the most dangerous of all, it managed to make killing and burning in the name of religion a daily behavior that threatens Muslims and non-Muslims in Sudan. These mosques use the weapon of fatwa to rearrange the political situation in a way that serves the authority, therefore, it was able to move with great freedom, and equally, it was able to spread the culture of extremism, violence, terrorism and takfir.

The Legal Association of Jurists and Preachers in Sudan: This is exemplified by some publications, books, statements and fatwas that have been issued by them, such as: the fatwa of Takfir of the Sudanese Communist Party issued by the Legal Association of Jurists in 2010, and the fatwa of the Jurists Association of Takfir Al-Turabi.

The Sudan Jurists Association: This is exemplified by some of the fatwas issued by it;
- The fatwa of Takfir for members of the Democratic Front issued by Sudanese Jurists in the year 2000.
- The Islamic Fiqh Academy: This is exemplified by some of the fatwas issued by it.
- The fatwa of Takfir of Sheikh Al-Turabi issued by the Islamic Fiqh Academy.

There are other authorities that were essential references in spreading violent extremism, even if it were indirect and not binding in all cases. Fatwas come, especially those that complement with and form support for extremist ideology. From this type of fatwa, we mention:

- Abd al-Hei's fatwa about burning the Christian book fair and considered those who call for democracy, socialism, and the equality of women with men as disbelievers, as well as the fatwa that stated that loyalty to the People's Movement is disbelieving.
- The Fatwa that prohibiting the celebration of the New Year's Day, and this fatwa was issued in brochure, one of the publications of the Maazin International Feminist Foundation. We note that Sheikh (Mohammed Al-Amin Ismail) reviewed this version, which means that he agrees with this fatwa. The Brochure was published in a series of issues of Maazin in late December 2017.
- And many other fatwas and statements that support the extremist ideology, and form some of the pillars of its infrastructure, we mention them according to what Sudanese journalist Al-Hadi Mohammed Al-Amin wrote on the Sudanese Online website on February 5, 2015, indicating to the statement issued by the Legal Association led by Al-Amin El-Hajj Mohammed Ahmed on October 30, 2013, according to which it prohibited to kill a believer as a punishment for killing a disbeliever, and that was in response to the judgment issued by the Criminal Court in Khartoum on 12/10/2009 sentenced to death by hanging of four Muslims who participated in the killing of the American diplomat and his Sudanese driver, which that statement stated that it is not permissible for a Muslim to work for an disbeliever as a servant, driver, or cook.
- The fatwa of the Republican Party, linking it to the execution of Mahmoud Mohammed Taha.

11. The most important questions that Islamic extremist ideology and violent extremist based on

There are many basic questions related to the issue of violent Islamic extremism, and these questions move between private and public issues, as it relates to the individual, family and society, It starts from the rights of family members among themselves, "wife and husband" and "children and parents" until it reaches the rights of the ruler over the ruled people and the rights of the ruled people over the ruler, it is worth noting that all of these rights are not classified and do not take their sense in extremist thought, except by looking it inside the issue of the caliphate, the guardian, or the governance, this thought is its primary bet on the ruler and the guardian, because the whole matter of religion for these groups is based only on the presence of a calipha for the Muslims, consequently, there is a governance.

Therefore, fundamental questions for extremist groups often include questions: Is jihad obligatory without parental consent? Is jihad obligatory without the permission of the governor? Among their questions: What is the opinion of religion on the agreements concluded with Western countries? The issue of the Islamist of constitution and citizenship issues, the opinion of religion on the democratic system, The limits of obedience to the ruler, Governance issues, the issue of loyalty and innocence in the relationship with non-Muslims, religion opinion on joining international institutions such as the United Nations, for example, the obligatory of supporting the oppressed Muslims, Equality of the disbeliever with a Muslim and the equality of women with men, The issue of denying the abominable? Congratulating the disbelievers on their holidays and sharing their events? Allowing secular parties to operate and appear in the media? And other questions of a comprehensive nature related in some way to the questions of the modern state and society, which are questions, represent a real challenge to activist Islam in its various currents and to the secular political forces alike.

12. The spread of the concept of violent extremism in Sudan

The terrorist operations that occurred in Sudan due to extremist ideology in the period subject of our approach (1990-2018) are inseparable from the global general movement of terrorist action before and after September 11, 2001.

Sudan has also been affected in recent years by the activity of terrorist groups that active in the regional environment (Arab and African) that have worked to recruit and attract Sudanese elements to put them in hotbeds of armed conflict, most notably:

- The activity of terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq; especially the activity of the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
- The activity of the Islamic State and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, who are working to recruit and attract Sudanese elements.
- . The jihadist salafistst current activity in West African countries; especially in northern Mali, which has become controlled by a number of armed Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda.
- The Young Mujahideen Movement in Somalia, to which a number of Sudanese joined, some of whom believed in the ideology of the Islamic movement, and some of them believed in the jihadist Salafist ideology.
- "Boko Haram" activity in Nigeria and its effects on security stability in the African region, especially its expansion in Chad, Niger and Cameroon, and the possibility of ideological compatibility with the currents of jihadist Salafist ideology and the takfiri groups in Sudan. A cell operating in coordination with Boko Haram has already been uncovered, and the head of the group, who is a Nigerian, has been arrested, according to what has been reported in some Sudanese newspapers.
- Al-Qaeda activity in the Maghreb, and its effects in the Arab and African surroundings across the Sahara, and the possibility of expansion and closer relationship with extremist movements in the Horn of Africa.

13. The most prominent terrorist operations that took place in Sudan from 1990 to 2018

It can be said that this period, especially after the year 2005, witnessed the most important terrorist acts in Sudan, and how not! this period witnessed the formation of new terrorist organizations around the world, as this period witnessed the emergence of Boko Haram, ISIS and the Somali youth movement, and in Sudan the emergence of the Youth of Es-Salamah, the emergence of the Dindir Cell and the killers of the American diplomat and others, in addition to the Al-Qaeda organization, which was already existed.

These terrorist organizations are supported by the spread of the jihadist Salafistst ideology and its expansion in Sudan under the conditional sponsorship of the Rescue Regime, in addition to the expansion of what is known as dynamic Islam in the Arab region and in Africa, and the implementation of many terrorist operations at the regional and international level, which has formed what can be called the ground or public space to the emergence of terrorist operations in Sudan during this period. Among the important observations in these terrorist operations that took place in Sudan: It was carried

out with the participation of Sudanese, some of whom returned from conflict hotspots, such as Somalia, Iraq and Syria, and some of it was done with the blessing or support of foreign organizations. In the sense that those who conducted it have organizational relations, either with Al-Qaeda or ISIS, or so they claim and that all of it - that is, these operations - did not even once target the Rescue Regime, neither in its leaders nor in its institutions. Even what the Dindir Cell performed it by attacking the police station, the aim was to take over the weapons. Also among the indicators is that most of those who participated in these operations were young people, the majority of their ages barely exceeded forty years old, and most of them belong to Salafists currents and ideological references that belong to non-Sudanese sheikhs. As for the terrorist incidents and operations that took place in Sudan, we mention:

- The incident of the armed attack launched by (Abdullah Al-Khulaifi), 1994: He is a Libyan, on a mosque of the Ansar al-Sunna group in El- Thawra District – Omdurman, after Friday prayers in 1994, which killed about 25 people.
- Operation of Camp Ten 1996.
- The operation of taking over the quarter of Camp 10 in the city of Wad Medani in 1996 by a Sudanese extremist group, which ended with the killing of all the group's members.
- The Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Mosque operation in El-Jarafa 2000, which carried out by Abbas al-Baqir Abbas in 2000 in a mosque for the Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadiyya group, north of the city of Omdurman, about 20 people were killed and more than 40 people were injured in the mosque, and the perpetrator of the operation, who was refused to surrender was killed by police bullets.
- Operation of Es-Salamah 2007, a group that was preparing to carry out terrorist operations targeting state institutions and the foreign presence in the country, 72 members of the group were arrested, some of the group members participated in the Dindir Cell in 2012, and others from the group participated in the assassination of the American diplomat in 2008.
- American diplomat Granville and his Sudanese driver Abbass 2008 killed on New Year's Eve 2008. The American diplomat "John Michael Granville", an official at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and his Sudanese driver, "Abd al-Rahman Abbas", were assassinated by a group that included five Sudanese who are classified within the current Jihadists in general, some of them were members of the Sudanese Islamic Movement; One of them was even an officer in the Sudanese Armed Forces. The plan of this group was to take action against American targets, and they chose zero hour on New Year's Eve. After the assassination of the American diplomat and his driver, the security agencies were able to arrest the perpetrators, and four of them were sentenced to death by hanging, the fifth was sentenced to prison, and he was released after

completing the period. The four persons sentenced to death managed to escape from prison in June 2010, and a police spokesperson said: "The four convicts escaped through the prison's "sewerage system" late on Thursday evening, and then exchanged fire with the police, before fleeing in a car passed a checkpoint in Omdurman, west of Khartoum, Friday early morning. The escape of the convicts, for which photos were published, which were recorded from inside the prison, indicated the involvement of Sudanese officials in facilitating the escape from inside the prison, and some reports indicated, through a similar escape of 23 people belonging to Al-Qaeda in Yemen, to the possibility the incident is relating to Al-Qaeda organization through powerful official in the government. The Sudanese government managed to arrest one of the convicted persons, (Abdul Raouf Abu Zeid), who is still in prison until now, while two of the group were killed in Somalia, one of them was killed by bullets from the Mujahideen Youth Movement in Somalia, according to Abd al-Raouf Abu Zaid in an interview with the Sudanese newspaper Al-Rai Al-Aam, published on March 6 and 7, 2018, and the fourth of them, as the same testimony stated that he is still fighting in Somalia.

- Attacks on the birth celebrations 2009: Confrontations with white weapons took place between the Al-Takfir and Al- Hijra group, and among them were foreigners and worshipers in the mosque of the quarter of"al-Asheir" in the city of Wad Madani, due to the citizens' celebration of the Prophet's birthday, which the group of takfir and Al- Hijra considers it as novelty and disbelief. In the same year a terrorist who was carrying a white weapon attacked the worshipers at a mosque in Al-Nasr 40 neighborhood in the city of Wad Madani, and he was arrested.

- Inauguration of the Sudanese Communist Party House in Al-Jareif, west, Khartoum: On the Sudanese Online website, the Sudanese journalist Alaa El-Din Mahmoud, wrote briefly, that: (A number of masked armed men attacked the Sudanese Communist Party's house, which inaugurated on Thursday, in the Al-Jareif west district, Khartoum state, and the attack took place following the completion of the ceremony held by the party. Leaders of the party branch in the region reported that the party's youth confronted to the terrorist attack and were able to capture them and hand them over to the police, who promised to perform the necessary procedures and protect the house at every activity of the party. And in clear support for the attack, Sheikh Mohammed Abdul Karim attacked today, during Friday prayers, the establishment of a house for the party, saying: (This house is a den of atheism, immorality, disobedience and sin, and he said that the Communist is a disbeliever even if he prays and fasts, and calls for not to marry them ...).

- Kassala Mosque terrorist incident: Citing from Al Jazeera "live broadcast" and the Anadolu News Agency: On March 28, 2018, the Sudanese police reported that a man carrying a knife attacked worshipers in a mosque in Kassala city in eastern Sudan, killing two people and five others were

wounding yesterday, Tuesday, before the worshipers killed the attacker as well. The Anadolu News Agency quoted from the Director of the State Police, Major General Yahya Al-Hadi, as saying that the "extremist" tried to make a speech after the evening prayer on Tuesday evening at a mosque in a neighborhood of Kassala city, however, the supervisors of the mosque refused to him to do so. He added that the attacker pulled out a knife, killing the Imam of the mosque and one of the worshipers, before the worshipers killed him while trying to stop him from attacking them.

- Dindir operation 2012: It was planned and implemented by a cell formed of young people, the eldest of whom is only a little over thirty years old. A member of the cell reported: "The initiative originally came from brothers who had experience in jihad work in Somalia, and our idea was to train in preparation for going to Mali or Somalia, after much thought, the Dindir region was chosen for securing reasons, as a place for camp and training. Then some disagreements occurred in the group when some of them said it must to fight the Sudanese government, indeed, the police station, which is located kilometers away from the Dindir Park, was attacked, killing a policeman and a member of the cell, and after the security agencies arrested the members of the cell, which their number was 32 members, to be subjected to trial".

Hatem Akareib, one of the leaders of the "Saihoon" Movement, said about the identity of the cell members "that they are the victims of the Sudanese Islamic movement's disagreements in the famous articulation that occurred between the pillars of the ruling regime in 1999," indicating that they are "brothers and sons of leaders in the Islamic movement, and that the precarious political reality in the country and the betrayal of covenants and charters, that is what led them to this path, so that ultimately ends with this cell to settle the matter related to the private right with the family of the murdered policeman, and then enter into what is known as "intellectual treatments" that began with this cell, and with others, with the participation of a group from specialists in Sharia sciences and Islamic thought, and we will elaborate more about the cell and intellectual treatments later.

14. Case Study: Dendir Cell

The Dindir Cell represents a model for study, as it is one of the most powerful extremist and terrorist organizations in Sudan, for several reasons, the most important of which are: the regional and international relations and connections of the cell in terms of thought, organization and financing; in addition, the cell represented a continuation of the goals of the Es-Salamah Cell group, and of the group that assassinated the American diplomat John Granville, the last reason is the planning

capabilities and the use of technology represented in the quality and quantity of devices that were controlled upon arrest.

15. About the cell:

The youth usually constitute the majority in most of the extremist currents, and the case of the Dindir cell is no different from that, as it consists of young people who, in general, embrace what is known as the Salafistst thought, which generally falls within the circle of jihadist Salafistst thought, as the Salafistst jihadist currents that adopt armed work is many, and there are many disagreements among them, so it is not possible to simplify the attribution of the Dindir cell to the Islamic State, to al-Qaeda, to Ansar al-Sharia, to the Mujahideen Youth, or anything else. The Dindir cell meets with all of them in many ideas and situations.

16. Intellectual Reference

The majority of cell membership is influenced by Salafist thought more than that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The books that were most influenced by them are the books of the Jordanian (Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi), such as his book "The Clear Reveals in the Infidelity of the Saudi State" and (Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) books. However, what should be mentioned here is that extremist ideology, as a globalized phenomenon, he was able, vigorously, to publish books and thesis and deliver discourse, especially on the Internet, and to form what can be called a coherent intellectual system, and he was able to construct a discourse that became able to form a great challenge to what is known as the moderate thought; However, this organization does not stop only when writing religious books dealing with jurisprudence, Sharia politics and other Daawa issues, rather, it goes beyond that to authorship in the fields of media, intelligence and military work, political fields, theories of revolution and change, and literary fields such as poetry and messages literature.

An example of this is the book "Security and Intelligence: A Legitimate Vision," written by the Egyptian Mohammed Salah El-Din Zidan, "Saif Al-Adl." Ayman al-Zawahiri's thesis, which is entitled "Raising the flag of Islam: A thesis in the correlation of governance and monotheism," and other books, thesis and discourses, by authors, preachers, and military personnel, of different nationalities belonging to this or that extremist organization, although the conflicts and differences between them that reach the point of fighting, as well as between al-Qaeda and ISIS, for example, but the common among them is still great, and their intellectual resistance requires a great cognitive and planning effort, due to their abundant production and their great ability to promote this production and make it accessible to

everybody without much hardship. Therefore, it was not surprising that this production, with its legitimate, organizational, military and intelligence levels, was shown in the work of the Dindir Cell.

What can be noted here, is that these extremist organizations; Among them are the Es-Salamah group and the Dindir cell, although it adopts the Salafistst ideology and expresses the hostility of Western civilization, and believes that the ideal model, in sociology, economics and politics, is what was represented by the experience of the Elmadina-state, and the experience of the Rashidun Caliphs. We also believes that religious knowledge in jurisprudence, interpretation, hadith, and what is known as legal politics is represented by the scholars of the Salaf (ancestors), it faces, with absolute ferocity, all attempts at renewal and Ijtihad (diligence). However, we find that it has invested heavily in the achievements of contemporary civilization, that is, the achievements of what is known as modernity, not only in the fields of communication technology, rather, it is in the fields of sciences, such as the natural sciences "physics and chemistry", psychology, media sciences, intelligence science, and management sciences. Among the leadership of these organizations and their multi-national membership those who have been educated in the institutions of modern education, in all its types and fields, to the extent that this is considered one of their most important features and one of the most important sources of their strength. Perhaps the reader will remember here, my indication to the necessity of looking at this phenomenon at one of its levels, as it is a manifestation of modernity with its inclusiveness and violent concept, which rises to a centrality that marginalizes and is hostile the diversity and difference.

17. Logistical Issues

The cell carried out a military operation, which was the attack on the "Qalqo" police station, killing one of its members, wounding four others, in addition to seizing the weapons that were there, the police also managed to kill a member of the cell. This operation would not have taken place without sufficient logistical support, includes money, means of communications, transportation and tools for implementation such as weapons and explosives. The pressing question here is, "How were these young people able to provide this support or important logistical issues?"

To answer this question, it is necessary to refer to what can be called "general Islamic values," by which we mean the values of a moral and ethical nature, which are not expected when granting a direct financial return, such as the values of solidarity and cooperation, consolation and advocacy, patience and sacrifice, asceticism, altruism, spending, and providing advice and counsel and others.

These values although what they constitute as a hidden source of the soft power of extremism, but most of the studies of extremism carried out by Westerners and secular Muslims do not pay much attention to it, perhaps because they, like the people of activist Islam, are preoccupied with the question of the relationship of religion to the state and human rights questions, and they neglect or forget the question of the relationship of religion to man, and the question of the relationship of religion to society. These values that Islam promotes, and which can only be effective in a process of space of tolerance, stability and security, these values with a long-standing history in Muslims societies, represent what can be called "soft attribution" of extremism, as it has been able to provide most of the logistical needs such as money, shelter, means of transportation, communications, weapons, explosives, and safe homes. The extremist groups have invested in these values, with or without the knowledge of the investing parties. In a society like the Sudanese society or other Muslim societies, you find someone who provides you with a service, whatever it is, without even knowing who you are. We note here that the Es-Salama Group and the Dindir Cell have benefited greatly from this value, in addition to their known cadres; they used their families, relatives, contacts, and secret cadres in matters of sheltering, disappearance, and traveling outside Sudan. It is no secret to the reader that the extremist organizations are based on an intellectual and organizational structure formed by the basis of an "intelligence mentality", among which (the Dindir cell) was able to work through cross-border networking, it has been proven that the Es-Salama group and the Dindir cell have relationships with some enclaves of this Internationalism movement. These organizations do not hesitate to reach their strategic goal, which is represented in fighting the "disbelievers," represented by "the Crusaders and Zionists, who supports them, where they have arrived and where they are." As the basic principle in Sharia is, in the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri: "Permission of the killing and the money of the disbelievers, except with peace, safety, or covenant, because the enemy's home is a battlefield, a house of looting and a house of permissibility" he mentioned this in his book (The Exoneration: A Message in the Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and the Sword … from the deficiency of the charge of impairment and weakness), p.208. These organizations do not hesitate in networking with arms dealers, smugglers, bribes, and forgers, and does not hesitate to fall into prohibitions, such as using lies, deception and forgery, do not hesitate of falling into taboos, such as using lies, deception and forgery. In all of this, it has its legal references, whether from the traditional jurisprudence record or from modern fatwas

Money, equipment and hardware

Based on my reference to the nature of extremist organizations, including the Dindir cell, in addition to what was reported by the cell's member, and some of what was stated in the newspapers at that time, then some information that I got from "official authorities" I do not feel astonished, and I do not surprise that all this hardware and all these equipment are among the cell's exhibits after it have been captured by the security agencies, and if it indicated anything; rather, it indicates the power of this cell, the diversity of its networks, and its superior ability to conceal and secrecy.

Regarding money, my interlocutor mentioned to me, who is a member of the cell: Some of the money they got after one of them sold his own vehicle as a donation to accomplish what they sought to achieve, and others came in the form of contributions from all the members of the cell, in addition to the sums they received from Somalia, and they do not have much information about them. We note here: Firstly, this desire to spend from all the members of the cell that arrives to donate the private vehicle, which is equivalent here to the horse, and it is an act if it indicates something; it indicates to the sacrifice and giving preference to fighting than other deeds.

Secondly: The size of the equipment and hardware, as we will see, its cost appears to be much greater than the money that was mentioned, which means that there are other funds that have not been disclosed, and this is more likely to me, and I do not exclude that the payers are some known personalities, such cell must have fosters outside and inside. For example, with regard to equipping the camp, we find that one of the group members bought an electric generator, and also bought 3 GPS devices. In the armament, the group bought 18 pieces of Kalashnikov, and two (2) pistols 9 mm, 1 pistol 8 mm, 1 "home industry" grenof, 1 pistol shotgun, and 2 pieces of granite. In the explosives, about 9 kilograms of nitrates were seized in the camp, along with electrical circuits and thermal bolts. Although the cell has a number of engineers and specialists in chemistry; however, the cell did not initiate explosives preparation during this period. Of course, the cost of transportation, communications, and the camp daily needs such as eating, drinking, etc., in addition to the cost of laptops, the cost of what we do not see, and what we should not know are added to the cost of the equipment.

18. General conclusions

I reached these general conclusions through the information available to me from my spokesperson (cell member), my friend returning from Mali, and from "some official bodies," and from what was written in newspapers and websites about the cell. The conclusions are:

- There are secret cadres, difficult to detect, who play very important soft roles, such as attracting finance, facilitating some communications, and providing housing.
- The cell used code names for its cadres, as it used methods of concealment and camouflage even on some of its members.
- The noticeable thing about this cell, which still needs analysis and interpretation, is its interference with the Es-Salama group, and with the group that assassinated the American diplomat, although some of them were interviewed in what was known as intellectual treatments, and announced that he abandoned this ideology; nevertheless, he participated in the operation of the Dendir cell.
- The presence of the external dimension and this is more clearly evident in the funding and establishing of the cell, and in the questions and issues that the cell based on.
- The cell used more than one name to express itself. It is once "men around the Prophet" and once "Ansar al-Sharia in Sudan" this indicates an awareness of what the name can play in camouflaging, and in promoting the idea and making it more acceptable.
- Most of the cell's members are related to the Salafistst currents and the Salafistst sheikhs, and few of them were influenced by the thought of the Sudanese Islamic Movement.
- One of the very important observations, which deserve contemplation and analysis, is that all the members of the cell, without exception, belong to what has become politically known as the geographical north, which includes the states of the River Nile, the Northern state, Gazira and the East, as we did not find even one of them from Darfur or Kordofan or even from Sennar or the Blue Nile, and most importantly of all this; That 23 of them live in Khartoum State.
- Some of the cell's members are those who have memorized the Holy Qur'an, and some lead (Imam) worshipers in some mosques in Khartoum State, also they are university graduates from different colleges, such as engineering and medicine.
- I noticed that the age of the cell's members at that time until 2012 ranged from 20 to 47 years distributed as follows: (Those who born in 1965 to 1978 they are 3 persons, those who born in 1980 to 1989 they are 23 persons, those who born in 1991 to 1992 they are 4 persons). The members of the cell at that time ranged from 22 to 32 years old, there was who 20 years old was, and there was who 47 years old was.

- With emergence this cell and the Es-Salama group, appeared in Sudan for the first time what was known by intellectual therapies, it is an experiment that needs study and analysis.

Finally, I conclude this general illumination with what was stated on the Nilein website, dated July 25, 2013, under the title: (Dindir Cell ... Security and Intellectual Challenges before the Terrorism Court). It came: "After the Criminal Investigations Prosecution completed the investigation and transferred the case file to the judiciary to adjudicate. In this file, which has exceeded one hundred and fifty pages, the prosecution has previously brought charges that carry the death penalty for 30 of the accused in the events of the Dindir park, and the authorities had arrested them, and charged them with charges related to participation in premeditated murder and looting, and the use of clothing and Military batches, unlawful training, stirring discontent, incitement to commit acts that disturb the order, and incitement of hatred against the regime, in addition to forming criminal and terrorist organizations and violating articles (65,63,62,60,69,175,21,130,139) of Criminal Law (5/6) of the Anti-Terrorism Law and Articles (7/11) of the Law on Protection of Wildlife, and Article (26) of the Weapons and Ammunition Law. On my part, I refer, and based on the previous source (the Nilein website), the accusation was dismissed by the prosecution for the special right, and this is because the guardians of the victim's waived their right to retribution in the case. Therefore, whereas the accusation was dismissed after the assignment, and after reviewing and implementation of Article (58) of the Criminal Procedures Law of 1991, and after the period the accused had spent in prison, the prosecution decided to release (23) members of them.

19. Case study: Sudanese students joining the Islamic State "ISIS"

In the past two years, the issue of students' travel to ISIS and their recruitment at Mamoun Humeida University, which began in March 2015 when nine male and female students suddenly disappeared, then announced their travel to Iraq and joining the Islamic State (ISIS), and then the next wave included 12 female and male students in June of the same year, the total was about 21 male and female students in less than four months. One of the strange paradoxes was that this happened in the University of Science and Technology, which includes the majority of expatriate students, and it is a university which is free of political activity or ideological orientation and the university is free of any political activity, and there is a religious association, which was the place where the students recruitment/ attraction process began. Although the university has a number of colleges, but most of the students who were recruited were from the Faculty of Medicine, and the only explanation for this is the need for ISIS to technicians to rebuild the country after its declaration and the need for doctors.

The other factor is that students hold non-Sudanese passports, which facilitated the transport and movement of students, also there were social relations and kinship relations among the students, which confirms the importance of peer relations and influence and it impact on the attraction process, as most students are in the same age range that seeking adventure, the psychological and social factor is great importance in the process of studying the issue of recruitment/ attraction. As well as most of the students grew up in the West - which leads to thinking that they were saturated with liberal values, freedom and pluralism, but that was not the issue. Most of them had limited knowledge of religion and religious discourse, and it was immature, so their recruitment process was easier. The recruitment was carried out by a Jordanian student of Palestinian origin. The case of ISIS in the university was circumstantial, and it was not repeated again. The number of women in the first group was greater than the number of male students. There are a number of students from other universities who joined ISIS, as the Minister of Interior announced that (70) Sudanese students had joined ISIS, and other groups went to Libya, Mali, and Somalia, but they did not exceed 174 female and male students.

In addition to students in Sudanese universities, the issue of the Sudanese students and young men and women in the Diaspora is a primary goal of extremist and Salafistst radical groups in the West. There are examples of mosques and groups that have influenced on the recruitment of a number of young people to ISIS and terrorist organizations. There are a number of questions about the Daeshi case, and is it related to the state of violence in Sudanese universities and its main causes? The main issue is that extremism does not happen by accident, but it is taught and developed through the environment and socialization, the educational curriculum are also filled with extremist discourse at all school levels, in the absence of tolerant religious discourse and criticized currents in religious thinking. Violence in Sudanese universities has an ancient history, and there is known events. However, the nature of the conflict and its weapons in the universities has changed since the beginning of the Islamic regime, in the sixties, it was limited to student struggle within universities, and the methods used in violence were limited to student groups, as for the nineties, it has become one of the main means of political control, especially in light of the presence of the opposition abroad, during the time of Alliance, and it became a means for the authority to control the student movement and its influence on the political movement, which changed the weapons and tools of violence, as well as being a focal point for attracting for the fighting in the south, the "Mujahideen" and the Popular Defense (which was based on students) with all the academic privileges that the "Mujahideen" students enjoyed and the establishment of jihadist units in universities, which led to the transformation of political violence and war as a weapon of suppression the student movement and comprehensive political treatments, and this is seem clear in the targeting of students from Darfur and the brutal treatment in detention

facilities, which led to the changing of the weapons and the nature of the student struggle to lose its peaceful character.

For example, violent training within student organizations was occurring with less acceleration. Now, it has become more rapid and violent incidents have dominated student struggles within the university, and have led to serious results, including ceasing most student unions, depriving students of the trade union system, increasing the number of assassinations in student sectors, and the assassinations and violence incidents passed without real accountability, the result was also the removal of the student sector from its effectiveness in the political movement in Sudan. This phenomenon, despite its seriousness, did not find a real study, due to the absence of the independence of universities and higher education.

Despite the decline of the issue of ISIS attraction in the University of Science and Technology and its circumstances, but question is still on the table, does the number that went reflect the natural tendency that exists in our culture and our conscience, and this, perhaps because it did not find a sufficient number of extremists to attract students, if the comparison is made to Tunisia despite the difference in the intellectual and political development between the two countries. There are 8,000 women and men Tunisians who have been recruited to ISIS, and this is a situation that needs to study the causes of attraction and the tendency for extremism, and the causes and scenarios of extremism in light of the economic and political changes in Sudan and the region.

20. Sudan's efforts to combat the phenomenon of violent extremism

Sudan's efforts have moved in different tracks that help to combat extremism and terrorism, these tracks, in their entirety, express military, and economic, intelligence, and security, diplomatic and intellectual efforts. The report deals with two types of efforts: the first is the efforts of civil society, political forces, and democratic forces, and the second is governmental and semi-official efforts.

21. The efforts of the government and semi-official agencies

The careful observer, insofar as he cannot deny that there is terrorism and violent extremism in Sudan that cannot be missed, he also cannot deny that there are governmental, semi-governmental and civil efforts to combat extremism in all its forms, and to combat terrorism. However, what cannot be overlooked or not mentioned is that the government's efforts cannot be viewed in isolation as they

themselves are often supportive of violent extremism and a foster of terrorism, not only with providing the protection, care and support to the leaders of extremism and violent extremism and to some terrorists, rather, its attempts to make terrorism one of its agenda in bargaining with the West, especially the United States. This reinforces some suspicions that the government often creates terrorists for certain tasks.

As for the extremist ideology, it sponsors it to terrorize its intellectual and political opponents, as well as I must point out that the government itself has often committed, through the military militias that sponsor it, many terrorist acts against its citizens in many areas of Sudan. As for semi-official and non-governmental bodies; it has roles, although it was less than ambitions, in combating violent extremism and terrorism, noting that most of these efforts come mostly from persons belong to the broad Islamic current, which is sometimes described as moderation, and it is a description from my point of view that needs deeper approaches.

22. Firstly: the track of the efforts of the National Security and Intelligence Service

These efforts began more clearly in early 1996, when Khartoum expelled the elements and individuals whom are suspicious of adopting terrorist ideas thesis, such as Osama bin Laden, who was asked by the Sudanese authorities to leave the country, and despite the United States' decision to classify Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, that resulting economic sanctions. However, Sudan, through the Sudanese Intelligence Service, worked to expand facilities and cooperation frameworks with the Arab, African, and international counterpart agencies. The year 2005 witnessed the establishment of an anti-terror unit between the American and Sudanese sides, as well as the National Security and Intelligence Service contributed to undermining many terrorist operations, and it also deported many extremist and terrorist elements to their countries. In addition, it exposed many terrorist plots directed against some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, for example. At the field level, the agency was able to dismantle a number of cells and arrest their members, we have referred to this throughout this approach, as we referred to the Es-Salama Group and the Dindir Cell.

23. Secondly: The track of legislative and legal action

In it, we say: Sudan has enacted some legislations and laws, and has joined many regional and international agreements, and specialized bodies concerned with combating terrorism and related crime, such as the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Law. Numerous presidential,

ministerial and executive decrees were also issued, most notably the Resolution of Council of Ministers No 358/2014 to implement UN Security Council Resolution No 1276/1988 and 1989 regarding the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the entities and individuals affiliated with the two organizations, and other decrees. In addition to the above; Sudan is a party to many regional and international agreements, charters and treaties, including the United Nations Convention against Terrorism 2004, the Arab Convention for Combating Terrorism 1999, and the International Convention to Combat the Financing of Terrorism.

24. Thirdly: The track of intellectual dialogue or what is known as intellectual treatments

What is meant here is the dialogue with the extremists of the argument, and I mentioned that this dialogue took place with many of them, as the Dendir cell members. It is an experience from my point of view that needs to be addressed a lot. If it has value, it is its assertion of the need for dialogue, and that there are other methods than security methods to combat terrorism, especially, as we have indicated, as is well known, terrorism starts from ideas. Perhaps what may help develop and deepen this experience is the emergence of many centers of an intellectual nature concerned with issues of Islam, such as the International Center for Daawa Studies, the Renaissance and Communication Center, and the Intellectual Fortification Center.

25. Fourthly: The track of publishing intellectual publications

These are Sudanese publications that discuss the most important foundations of extremist ideology. We mention here the book (Dialogue with a Young Man) which was printed three times, once it was printed by its author, Sheikh Abd al-Haei Youssef, once it was printed by the Sudan Jurists Association, and once by the Islamic Fiqh Academy it was printed under the title: (Questions of Youth), the book answers 48 questions that collectively constitute the foundations of extremist thought, such as issues related to governance and politics, issues related to the status of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, and issues related to how to inference Sharia law. It is a controversial book, and it represents a special value in discussing extremist ideology, even if it contains a lot of what needs pause and review, as that the author launched from the same ground of the extremists, and this is to the extent that it may carry positive aspects, but its disadvantages are also many.

As for the second book, which was comprehensive and rectified, and which is also considered a move and addition in the discussion of the foundations of extremist thought, it is the book (The Enlightened

Guidance to the Most Important Controls in Ruling by Takfir … a Contemporary Analytical View), written by Dr. Ibrahim Al-Karouri. The book discussed 22 female officers, all of whom moved to approach a central issue, which is the issue of takfir in its relationship to what is political, ideological, cultural, intellectual and social, in all this, the book combined the jurisprudential heritage and modern Islamic thought with questions of a new and changing reality. It is an important book in the context of dialogue with extremist ideology.

26. Fifth: The advocacy and media track,

Here the default is very clear. The distance is long between the presence of what fuels extremism in the media apparatus and what is considered an antidote to this nutrition. What is not disputed about him is that he who dominates the religious discourse in the official and private media apparatus is the Salafistst discourse, and without a dispute. And if there are efforts here for moderate thought, then they are very few. Therefore, the need to build a strategy that pushes enlightened preachers and scholars to produce moderate religious discourse through these devices of great influence is emphasized.

27. Efforts of civil society and civil and political forces

 In general, it is possible to speak here of efforts of an enlightening nature that work to criticize the foundations of extremist thought. The focus was often on what is known as political Islam and its theses, such as the contributions of Mansour Khaled, Haider Ibrahim Ali and the Republican Brothers. The interest of violent extremism and terrorism in the agenda of civil society it is clearly started recently, and this was represented in the holding of some workshops and seminars discussing violent extremism and looking at developing strategies to confront it, and perhaps this is what makes us in this report, to refer only to the Sudanese group for combating violent extremism, which was established in 2018 as the first civil society organization concerned with confronting the violent extremism thoughtfully.

28. Conclusion

There are two facts that can be drawn from this general map, in which I tried to refer to the state of extremism in Sudan and its terrorist actions.

The first fact is that there is violent extremism in Sudan, which has technical and financial capabilities, and has relations with international terrorist and extremist organizations and groups, and that it based on an ideological base that must not be underestimated with the difficulty of dismantling it.

The second fact, it is represented that there are Sudanese efforts, some of which are governmental, and some are carried out by civil society organizations, activists, intellectuals, and thinkers among the enlightened Islamists and rationalists, although these efforts, and the positive action they have done, but it needs creative coordination amongst themselves to base on setting a Sudanese strategy to combat extremism and terrorism, away from any narrow ideological sensitivities..

Note:

- Concerning Sudan's efforts to combat extremism and terrorism, please review the international conventions and covenants on combating terrorism in the book written by Dr. Khadija Abdullah Mohammed Abdullah (The Impact of Terrorism on the Sudanese National Security), Sudan Currency Printing Press Company - Edition 1, 2015 - from pp. 180 to p. 194.

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2. A testimony from the young man returning from Mali.

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